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1 »Σημειον εστιν ου μερος ουθεν.« Euclid’s commentators have observed that, unlike
his predecessors, Euclid chooses not to define the point, line, and surface by the
subsequent term (for example: that the point is the end of a line). For further in-
formation on the historical context of this definition, and other possible transla-
tions, see Thomas Heath: The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements. New York
1956, p. 155. 
2 »Weiß man was ein Punkt ist?« (KFSA 18, p. 229: no. 427). I cite from the Kri-
tische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe (= KFSA) throughout. References are to vol-
ume, page, and aphorism number.
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Schlegel, Hardenberg, 
and the Point of Romanticism
For Euclid, the point was evident enough to forgo explanation. The
definition which initiates the Elements of Geometry – »a point is
that which has no part«1 – suffices for the point to take part in the
construction of the circles, parabolas, ellipses and hyperbolas which
comprise the remainder of the thirteen-book treatise. Early German
Romanticism, with its fondness for definitions and formulae, also
uses points and geometrical forms to plot conceptual trajectories
in a visual field. Romantic statements on the point cover a vast ter-
rain. They do not necessarily distinguish between mathematical
and physical points, and they include other points of interest
around 1800 (such as the Fluchtpunkt or vanishing perspectival
point of the work of art and the punctum saliens William Harvey
observes in chick embryos). For both Friedrich Schlegel and
Friedrich von Hardenberg, the point is something which can easily,
perhaps too easily, be mobilized, to the degree that its inherent ob-
viousness (or status as an original intuition) becomes more elusive.
Even after he summons the point to do the work of history, science,
theology and philology, Schlegel can still ask »Does one know what
a point is?«2 
This essay is an attempt to cull through Schlegel’s and Harden-
berg’s widely dispersed statements about the point and identify cer-
tain tendencies which could fall under the rubric of what Hardenberg
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3 Novalis: Schriften. Die Werke Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Hg. v. Paul Kluck-
hohn und Richard Samuel. 6 Bde. Stuttgart u. a. 1960 ff (= NS): NS 3, p. 151:
no. 500: »Philosophie des Punkts«. Johannes Hegener: Die Poetisierung der
Wissenschaften bei Novalis. Bonn 1975, reads this quote in the context of the
Romantic theory of the fragment. He observes that it is the characteristic struc-
ture of the fragment to collect »everything into a point« so that, as Hardenberg
writes, they are both »undetermined« and »absolutely capable«; NS 2, p. 540:
no. 68, quoted in Hegener, p. 334. For further references to the problem of the
point in the critical literature on Romanticism, see Marshall Brown: The Shape
of German Romanticism. Ithaca, N.Y. 1979; Martin Dyck: Novalis and Mathe-
matics. New York 1969, pp. 58-61.
4 »Wer ein System hat, ist so gut geistig verloren, als wer keins hat. Man muß eben
beides verbinden«. KFSA 18, p. 80: no. 614.
5 »Jeder [Philosoph] hat auch seine Linie – Tendenz wie sein punctum s[aliens]
und seinen Cyclus«. KFSA 18, p. 80: no. 614.
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fleetingly describes as a »philosophy of the point.«3 The motiva-
tion to argue for the ›tendencies‹ of the Romantic point comes
from Schlegel himself. One of his better-known aphorisms states,
»[w]hoever has a system is just as spiritually lost as he who has
none. One has to combine both.«4 This is, however, only the sec-
ond half of the aphorism. Before the question of a system is even
raised, Schlegel claims that »Every philosopher also has his line –
tendency, just as his (salient) point and his cycle.«5 These figures
have a rhetorical function: they provide Schlegel with a way of cir-
cumventing the contradiction of having a system and having none,
and they also work historically, allowing Schlegel to determine the
affinities between different philosophers over time. 
Keeping Schlegel’s emphasis in mind, I will argue that there are
two basic tendencies in the deployment of the point in Romantic
thought. The first concerns how the Romantics use the point to
construct a trajectory in the history of philosophy. This is a ques-
tion of points in motion which can be charted and visualized with
temporal and spatial coordinates. The second tendency has to do
with the importance of the point for the Romantics’ own project.
This tendency, as it turns out, has just as much to do with points
at rest. It reveals itself under the sign of the mechanical lever, which
comes as somewhat of a surprise, given that Romantic thinking is
usually associated with the metaphors and the particular teleology
6 The history of the point prior to Romanticism has been summarized by Friedrich
Kaulbach (s. v. »Punkt, Punktualität«. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philoso-
phie. Hg. v. Joachim Ritter. Vol. 7. Darmstadt 1971, col. 1711-1714). Kaulbach’s
entry begins with Aristotle and Zenon and ends with Whitehead and Merleau-
Ponty, but it leaves out Romanticism altogether.
7 »Zur Welt suchen wir den Entwurf – dieser Entwurf sind wir selbst – was sind
wir? personificirte allmächtige Puncte«. NS 2, p. 541: no. 74.
8 Michel Serres : Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques. Vol. 2. Paris
1968, p. 739.
89of organic generation, rather than mechanical clockwork. In the
following discussion of the points in motion and at rest in Schlegel’s
and Hardenberg’s aphorisms, the question will also be raised of how
the Romantic point connects to the debates in theology, philoso-
phy and the natural sciences that comprise the point’s conceptual
history.6 The Romantic point synthesizes these different traditions:
not only through reflections on the ›constructive character‹ of
philosophy in general, but also by drawing on the specific topics in
the history of the point as part of Romanticism’s own construct of
individuality. The concluding pages offer an example of how this
latter aspect of the point might find further application by outlining
its relevance to discussions of the Romantic political subject as well.
1. The point at the beginning of philosophy
The point as the beginning point of a philosophical construction
serves as a reminder, how closely the paths of human intellectual
history and the history of nature are intertwined for the Romantics:
Hardenberg observes that »we seek the design of the world – yet
we are this design – what are we? personified, all-powerful
points.«7 The perspective underlying Hardenberg’s idea of the self
as point and blueprint of the world is a relatively modern develop-
ment that echoes Leibniz’s synthesis of two philosophical positions
according to Michel Serres: whereas for Aristotle and Descartes the
world was a point, and for Pascal and Bruno in every point there
was potentially a world, Leibniz sees »in every real and different
individual, the Universal.«8 Schlegel would concur: as humans, we
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9 »Wäre d[er] Raum voll so würde die Zeit still stehn – das ist das 1/0 in d[er]
Progreß.[ion] der Natur. Auch wieder ein Chaos aber ein viel höheres, durchaus
gebildetes. Das erste Chaos ist nur ein Punkt. – Aus Chaos und Allegorie die
Welt zu construiren. Geschichte der Natur von jenem 0/1 – 1/0. –« KFSA 18,
p. 421: no. 1226.
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have the ability to recognize ourselves as the personified trajectories
of history, and as the living blueprints of the world as it has emerged
from its point of departure. Schlegel writes that the first chaos is a
point from which the world can be constructed: 
Were space full, then time would stand still – that is the 1/0
in the progression of nature. Also once more a chaos but a
much higher, completely formed [one]. The first chaos is
only a point. – From chaos and allegory the world to be con-
structed. History of nature from that 0/1 – 1/0. –9
The first chaotic point of this aphorism is the beginning of the
world and the world’s construction through allegorical narrative.
Schlegel designates this point as zero, and the history which unfolds
from it is one whose end limit, the end of time, is an infinity thick
with simultaneous points, marked by a neat inversion of zero and
one. As evident as Schlegel’s equation of a beginning point with
zero might seem to be – in particular, given the Romantic fascina-
tion for the figure of creatio ex nihilo – only relatively recent de-
velopments in mathematics and mechanics make his claim credible
in the first place. Wolfgang Schäffner has described how until the
seventeenth century, the Euclidean point of geometry was associ-
ated not with zero, but with one. This correlation had to do with
a prevailing distinction between arithmetic as the science of dis-
continuous magnitudes and geometry as the science of continuous
magnitudes in place since Aristotle. According to this way of look-
ing at things, in arithmetic the ›one‹ was considered the beginning
of all numbers, without itself being a number. Schäffner discusses
how, according to the older model:
In the same way as the point was the beginning of all geom-
etry, the number one was the origin of all numbers. Neither
10 Wolfgang Schäffner: »The Point: The Smallest Venue of Knowledge in the 17th
Century (1585-1665)«. In: Collection, laboratory, theater: scenes of knowledge
in the 17th century. Helmar Schramm/Ludger Schwarte/Jan Lazardzig eds. Ber-
lin 2005, pp. 57-74: p. 60.
11 Schäffner: »The Point« (see footnote 10), p. 59.
12 Stevin writes: »What does the point have in common with the number one?
Certainly nothing at all, since two units result (as is said) in a number, but two
or even a thousand points will not result in a line. The unit can be divided into
parts […] but the point is indivisible; the unit is part of the number, but the point
is not a part of the line. Therefore, in relation to the number, the unit is not the
same as the point in relation to the line. What, then, corresponds to the point? I
say it is zero…«. Quoted in Schäffner: »The Point« (see footnote 10), p. 60.
13 Brian Rotman: Signifying Nothing. New York 1987, p. 11. Rotman’s argument is
actually much broader: he shows how the introduction of the zero in mathematical
discourse, the initial use of the vanishing point in perspectival painting, and the in-
vention of imaginary money are all events of seismic nature for their respective semi-
otic systems. Each of these three signs, according to Rotman, has a »natural
closure« with regard to the original system (he gives the example of how the special
status of the zero led to the invention of the algebraic variable that can potentially
stand in for all numbers) (ibid., pp. 28-32). This »closure« of the system within a
»meta-sign«, in turn, »accompanies a self-conscious form of subjectivity« (ibid.,
p. 28). There will be occasion to return to this argument later in the paper.
91of them was itself a part of its domain, but rather its indivis-
ible limit and origin.10
Schäffner explains how the Dutch mathematician Simon Stevin,
in his 1585 work Arithmétique, is in part responsible for changing
the status of the point. Stevin’s Arithmétique begins by defining
the concept of ›number‹ as that »through which the quantity of
a thing is expressed« and claiming that one is also a number.11 Im-
porting the idea of continuous magnitudes from geometry into
arithmetic, he insists that the one, as basic arithmetical unit, is di-
visible into parts and should no longer to be considered just a unit
of counting. As a consequence of the change in definition, a long-
standing equivalence between the one and the geometrical point
no longer holds. The one is divisible, the point is not, and Stevin
affirms that the indivisibility of the point can only correspond to
the zero.12 In his book, Signifying Nothing, Brian Rotman describes
the zero in terms of a »meta-sign in relation to the system that gen-
erates it.«13 Because it is both a number and a »sign about num-
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14 Rotman: Signifying Nothing (see footnote 13), p. 14.
15 »Es gibt eine [Mystik + Kritik]/0 – wie Fichtes Punkt. Jeder [Philosoph] hat,
muß einen solchen Punkt haben. Bei Spinosa war es wahrscheinl[ich] [Mystik +
Ethik + Logik]/0, da Spinosa eine äusserst ethische Natur ist. Ein progreßiver
[Philosoph] hat andre veranlaßende Punkte, die ihn nicht selten real beschrän-
ken, an die er sich accomodirt pp – so Descartes für Spinosa, Kant für Fichte pp.
Bei solchen Punkten bleiben dann im System dunkle Stellen. Die Mischung der
Neuen und d[er] Alten hier oft so unauflöslich, bis zum Stillstehn alles Verstan-
des, wie in ähnlichen Fällen im [ethischen] Gebiet. – Der erste Punkt kann auch
polemisch sein; so beim Skeptiker.« KFSA 18, p. 80: no. 609.
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bers«, it exists both within, and externally to the numerical sys-
tem.14 This background information about the zero’s special dual
status shows that there is a historical precedent for the primitive
ambivalence of the point as limit and origin in Schlegel’s aphorism,
an ambivalence between being something and being nothing in-
dexed by its position and its value of zero, and it also shows that
Schlegel relies on a modern equation between geometric and arith-
metic magnitudes, or spatial and temporal magnitudes.
The function of allegory in Schlegel’s aphorism cited above – by
no means self-evident – seems to be to inscribe the zero of the point
into a language of world, history, and nature. The human »con-
struction« of the world though allegory that Schlegel describes as
the »history of nature« between a zero point and infinity appears
in other fragments as the basic formula of philosophical projects:
There is a [mysticism + critique]/0 – like Fichte’s point.
Every [philosopher] has, must have such a point. In Spin-
oza’s case it was probably [mysticism + ethics + logic]/0,
since Spinoza is of an extremely ethical nature. A progressive
philosopher has other inciting points, that not infrequently
really limit him, towards which he adjusts himself pp – thus
Descartes for Spinoza, Kant for Fichte pp. Around such
points then remain dark places in the system. The mixture
of the new and the old here often so indissoluble up until
the standstill of all understanding, as in similar cases in the
realm of ethics. The first point can also be polemical, as with
the Skeptics.15
93In this aphorism, Schlegel suggests that the point operates histori-
cally and ahistorically within every system. Every system has its own
unique point from which it emerges (his example is Fichte), but
there are also those points – Schlegel calls them »inciting points«
(»veranlaßende Puncte«) – that apply limits to their immediate
philosophical context (like Descartes for Spinoza, Kant for Fichte).
These other, historically-inflected points not only place real con-
straints on each new system, they define »dark places« within it
which have a peculiar status. Given the repeated abbreviation
»pp« (per procura), one could also say that the older philosophers
are present in the new system ›by proxy‹. They designate moments
of cognitive stasis: an irresolvable conflict of understanding between
old and new that manifests itself as the ›standstill of all understand-
ing‹, a lacuna in the historical progression of thought. The irony
of the aphorism, that the »progressive« philosopher integrates rad-
ically »non-progressive« elements within the system, is effectively
a paradox that the aphorism describes and performs at the same
time. These elements, defined as the simultaneity of old and new,
are analogous to the condition of the temporal standstill we have
already seen defined as a thickening of points and the stopping of
time. The particular dual historical and ahistorical status of the
point as described by Schlegel also reinforces its similarity to the
mathematical zero according to Rotman’s description of it as a sign
both internal and external to the system that generates it. Schlegel’s
innovation is to reframe the point’s dual status in terms of a his-
torical narrative and thereby generate a »poetics« of the point by
creating a narrative that remains in tune with its problematic dual
status. At the same time, however, it is worth keeping in mind that
Schlegel’s and Novalis’s thinking about the history of philosophy
leaves few traces of a direct engagement with those philosophers
who actually made the most notable contributions to the discus-
sion of the point from the Renaissance through the eighteenth cen-
tury. To take the examples of Giordano Bruno and Gottfried
Leibniz, both of which figure prominently in the history of the
Schlegel, Hardenberg, and the Point of Romanticism
16 As Kaulbach has shown, mystical and mathematical discussions of the point play
prominent roles in Bruno’s work, where one can observe the crystallization of
two tendencies: a »dynamic« point concept on the one hand, and the idea of
point as »limit« on the other; Kaulbach: »Punkt, Punktualität« (see footnote
6), col. 1711-1712. The first relates to the point as monad, a point of force capable
of generating other forms; the second receives further emphasis in Galileo’s and
Leibniz’s discussion of the continuum (for example, as the sum of points traversed
by falling objects). Leibniz, in the Système nouveau (1695), will eventually dis-
tinguish between the metaphysical, the mathematical, and the physical point,
whereby the metaphysical is understood as the basis for the other two. It is diffi-
cult to summarize Leibniz’s thinking about the point because he changed his po-
sition significantly over time. The early Leibniz, for example, conceived of the
mind within »an unextended and indivisible point« that does not have physical
position (Christia Mercer: Leibniz’s Metaphysics. Its Origins and Development.
Cambridge 2001, pp. 161-162); Leibniz later backs away from this position and
write that souls »can be in a place« and can also »be in the body they animate«;
Robert Merrihew Adams: Leibniz. Determinist, Theist, Idealist. New York 1994,
p. 251. In turn, the body »makes the soul its point of view« (ibid., p. 252). 
17 »Ein […] vor der Verbindung vorher und unabhängig von ihr gewisser Satz heisst
ein Grundsatz. Jede Wissenschaft muss einen Grundsatz haben.« Johann Gott-
lieb Fichte: »Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre oder der sogenannten
Philosophie« [2. Aufl. Jena/Leipzig 1798]. In: Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Sämmt-
liche Werke. Immanuel Hermann von Fichte, ed. Vol. 1. Berlin 1965, p. 41 (»A
proposition [...] which is certain prior to and independently of the association
with others, is termed a first principle.« Johann Gottlieb Fichte: »Concerning
the Concept of the ›Wissenschaftslehre‹«. In: Early Philosophical Writings.
Trans. Daniel Breazeale. Ithaca 1988, p. 104).
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point,16 one finds only one or two scattered remarks relating to
Bruno’s mysticism and Leibniz’s concept of the minimum. At best,
they can be said to occupy ›dark places‹ in the Romantic poetics
of the point: potentially formative, but of obscure causality.
Schlegel’s aphorism makes clear the degree to which his thinking
about the point and its relevance for philosophy is more indebted
to Fichte rather than the canonical philosophers of the point. His
equation of an irreducible infinite quantity to the salient point of
the philosophical system is a restatement of the Fichtean motto
that the entirety of the system should be derivable from its basis.17
Other aphorisms also illustrate the degree to which Romanticism
places particular emphasis on Fichte when it comes to the point.
Schlegel might call the philosopher Hülsen the »master in the
18 »Hülsen ist Meister in d[er] Curve, Fichte in d[er] Parallele und im Punkte«;
KFSA 18, p. 204: no. 84; »Fichte’s [Philosphie] ist zugleich Punkt, Cirkel und
gerade Linie«; KFSA 18, p. 31: no. 131.
19 Translated alternately as the »theory« or »science« of knowledge; I will keep
the German throughout.
20 Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings (see footnote 17), p. 120. »Die Wissen-
schaftslehre giebt als nothwendig den Raum, und den Punct als absolute Grenze;
aber sie lässt der Einbildungskraft die völlige Freiheit den Punct zu setzen, wohin
es ihr beliebt«; Fichte: Sämmtliche Werke. Vol 1 (see footnote 17), p. 64.
21 Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings (see footnote 17), pp. 120-121. The entire
passage reads as follows: »Sobald diese Freiheit bestimmt wird, z. B. ihn gegen
die Begrenzung des unbegrenzten Raumes fortzubewegen, und dadurch eine
Linie zu ziehen, sind wir nicht mehr im Gebiete der Wissenschaftslehre, sondern
auf dem Boden einer besonderen Wissenschaft, welche Geometrie heisst.«
Fichte: Sämmtliche Werke. Vol. 1 (see footnote 17), p. 64.
95curve«, but Fichte, whose philosophy »is at once point, circle, and
straight line«, is undoubtedly the master of the point.18 Although
the Romantic’s choice of the word »point« with reference to
Fichtean philosophy likely connects to Fichte’s desire to unfold his
entire system from a single intuition or act of self-positing, Fichte
himself is careful to distinguish between the point of departure pro-
vided by the Wissenschaftslehre,19 and the science of geometry. In
his text On the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre or the Socalled
Philosophy (1794; 1798) he writes, »The Wissenschaftslehre fur-
nishes us with space as something necessary, and with the point as
absolute limit. But it grants to the imagination complete freedom
to place the point wherever it likes.«20 Once this point has been
determined – in other words, once it has been posited, and then
set in motion, so that the trajectory of a line emerges in our mind’s
eye – we »no longer find ourselves within the domain of the Wis-
senschaftslehre, but instead within the territory of a particular sci-
ence [Wissenschaft] called ›geometry.‹«21 Fichte therefore keeps
geometry’s task of dividing and constructing within space distinct
from the concerns of the Wissenschaftslehre. On the basis of this
passage, it would seem as if the Romantics did not quite get Fichte’s
point. They call his philosophy one of geometrical forms, but here
he argues for a very rigorous use of language of shapes and forms.
Fichte permits a point to be placed just once in an initial gesture of
Schlegel, Hardenberg, and the Point of Romanticism
22 Schäffner: »The Point« (see footnote 10), p. 57.
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personal freedom through the exercising of our imagination, but
the moment we depart from that initial point – the moment we
attempt to inscribe any more of ourselves into the Wissenschaft-
slehre other than the fact that we exist in the first place – we plum-
met from the aether onto the hard ground of a particular science
of shapes called geometry. 
Fichte’s distinction between a point which is theoretically ›given‹
as opposed to one which is actually ›posited‹ in visual terms, as the
difference between the point that one thinks as a concept and the
point that one sees before one’s eyes, has its corollary in Early Mod-
ern commentaries on Euclid as well as Leibniz’s distinction be-
tween the mathematical and physical point. Here too, Wolfgang
Schäffner’s work is particularly helpful. Euclid defines the point as
»that which has no part« using the Greek word semeion, meaning
›sign‹. Schäffner writes that 
[t]he smallest of all venues is a weightless sign which indi-
cates the absence of all sizes and extent. The point is a se-
meion, as in Euclid’s Elements, the most innocuous sign of
all signs, a stigmé, as it is called in Aristotle’s Physics, whose
Latin translation punctum has been preserved in the words
Punkt/point/punto: the point is a puncture, a hole actually,
from which the world of magnitudes and extensions seems
to fall out, an operation of discontinuity and interruption,
and at the same time the beginning and the end of all con-
tinuous magnitudes.22
Schäffner describes how Early Modern commentaries of Euclid’s
Elements led to the distinction between »sign« and »diagram«
based on the representation of the point. Geometrical operations
require diagrams. They turn mathematical points into physical
ones: »in the moment in which the elements of geometry appear
as diagrammatic operations, out of the mathematical science of
23 »In dem Moment, in dem die Elemente der Geometrie als diagrammatische Ope-
rationen erscheinen, wird aus der mathematischen Wissenschaft der Geometrie
eine Notations- und damit Medientechnik«, Wolfgang Schäffner, »Stevin, der
Punkt und die Zahlen«. In: ›Der liebe Gott steckt im Detail‹: Mikrostrukturen
des Wissens. Wolfgang Schäffner/Sigrid Weigel/Thomas Macho, eds. München
2003, pp. 203-218: p. 206.
24 »Die Ellipse, der Cirkel, die Parabel und Hyperbel sind nur Explosionen, Ent-
wicklungen d[es] Punkts, der höchst mystisch gedacht werden muß. Im primiti-
ven Punkt ist Dualität. Ellipse das erste Symbol desselben; Cirkel und Parabel
nur Abweichung, Extreme der Progression aller Nüancen von Ell.[ipse] selbst
nicht mehr«; KFSA 18, p. 156: no. 398.
25 Hobbes’ conatus takes part in a larger debate, whose participants include Galileo
and Newton, about the relation of the point concept to a continuum of motion.
Hobbes introduces his term as a way of conceptualizing the motion within an in-
finitely small space and time; see Kurd Lasswitz: Geschichte der Atomistik vom
Mittelalter bis Newton. Hildesheim 1963, pp. 214-224. Rather than engaging in
this discussion directly, Schlegel and Hardenberg’s aphorisms draw upon some
of the basic questions, such as the tension between points at rest and points and
motion, and rework them on a meta-historical level.
97geometry comes a technology of notation and thus of media«23 On
the basis of a distinction between what can provisionally be called
a semiotic and a medial point (»medial« in the sense of something
that makes something else visible by disappearing), Fichte seems to
opt for the former, and the Romantics for the latter. 
When Schlegel and Hardenberg state that philosophy can be
charted in geometric shapes and equations which follow the trajec-
tory of the point, they do not differentiate strictly between the cre-
ation of geometrical form and philosophical practice: between a
theory of philosophy and its Hilfswissenschaften. That said, they
also do not always converge in their own paths towards the point.
The kinds of points discussed so far have tended to initiate trajec-
tories of motion, or, as Schlegel writes, »explosions« and »expan-
sions« of a single point »that must be thought of as greatly
mystical.«24 Without taking it up directly (and perhaps with deli-
berate emphasis on the earlier, mystical tradition) this tendency
correlates to Hobbes’ concept of the »conatus,« which describes
the motion through a point within an instant.25 We have also, how-
ever, already seen examples of a counter-tendency, where points at
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26 Heinz von Foerster’s concept of »blind spots« – points that allow for observa-
tion but themselves cannot be observed – is relevant here.
27 »Der Punct kann nicht, als bewegt, gedacht werden. / Bestimmte Sfäre der Be-
stimmung. / Grundsätze des Definirens. / Namengeben /«; NS 2, p. 282: no. 629.
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rest are embedded in pivotal roles in a particular Romantic notion
of the »constructive character« in philosophical development: not
only as beginning points and ending points, but also as dark places
in the system.26 While Schlegel’s aphorisms are ambivalent in this
regard, Hardenberg suggests that although the point can be
thought of in the context of motion, it cannot itself be conceived
in motion: »The point cannot be thought as moved. / Determined
sphere of determination. / Basic principles of defining. / Namegiv-
ing /«27. The aphorism recalls Euclid’s early claim that the point
has position but not dimensions. The movement of the point in
space or time would implicate it in a multi-dimensional figure. Yet,
in the logic of this aphorism, the motionless point is not antithetical
to a »determined [or definite] sphere of determination.« We have
seen other cases that also couple a cognitive impulse with a geomet-
ric principle; here the emphasis is not on the creation of a system,
but the granting of a name – not to the universal, but to the indi-
vidual. While the aphorism only hints that the point may have
something to do with the subject, other aphorisms which refer to
Hardenberg’s studies of mechanics offer more revealing clues for
understanding his interest in the fixed point. Both Hardenberg and
Schlegel focus their attention on a particular point which hovers
between the mathematical and the physical, between theory and
mechanical application, between sign and diagram, and it is pre-
cisely this point with which Schlegel and Novalis inscribe them-
selves into a philosophy of the subject reaching well beyond Fichte.
The central figure in this context is the mechanical lever, and the
fulcrum around which it revolves.
2. Fixed points and levers
The history of the lever is a history of the individual’s exercise of
power. Hardenberg studied mechanics in addition to mathematics
28 Pappus of Alexandria: Collectionis. Book 8. Berlin 1878, p. 1060. Many thanks
to Charitini Douvaldzi for help with the Greek.
29 Diodorus: The Library of History. In: Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes.
Charles Henry Oldfather, ed. Cambridge, Mass/London 1957, vol. 1, p. 1 -
vol. 12, p. 295: vol. 11, p. 195.
30 »[...] de la théorie de l’équilibre à celle du mouvement, de la géometrie pure à la
cosmologie, de la science de la vision à la vision du monde et du destin humain,
tous ces exemples ont au minimum en commun la recherche d’un point fixe. Dans
tous les cas, ce point est la référence sans laquelle nulle loi ne saurait être établie,
nul désordre apparent soumis à la droite raison, nulle définition précisée; et, plus
généralement, aucune mesure, aucune proportion, aucun ordre« ; Serres: Le sys-
tème de Leibniz (see footnote 8), pp. 657-658.
99and the natural sciences at the mining academy of Freiberg. As a
student of mechanics, he of course knew about Archimedes, one of
the first theoreticians of the lever. Archimedes described the equi-
librium on a simple lever with concepts of weight and distance from
a resting point (what scientists today call a »first class« lever: the
one which looks like a see-saw or Wippe). Pappus of Alexandria
has famously reported Archimedes as saying that he would be able
to move the earth given just one fixed point.28 Pappus uses the word
sto for stand, from the verb istemi, from which the word »stasis«
is derived. In another record of the quote from Archimedes,
Diodorus of Sicily expresses the same sentiment in slightly different
language when he writes: »Again, he [Archimedes] used to say, in
the Doric speech of Syracuse: ›Give me a place to stand and with a
lever I will move the whole world.‹«29 Instead of sto, Diodorus
uses bo, from baino, from which the word »basis« comes. In the
first quote, the lever is only implied, with the effect of lending the
static »I« an aura of greater strength. The second quote, which
cites the instrument, also serves as a reminder that not just one but
two points are needed: one upon which to stand, and one upon
which to place the lever. There are echoes of both in the philosoph-
ical programs of modernity (which is to be expected, in keeping
with Michel Serres’s suggestion that diverse branches of human
thought such as geometry, cosmology or optics, have in common
the search for a fixed point, without which measure, order and law
are impossible30). Descartes writes in the second of his Meditations
(1641),
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31 Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy. Trans. Michael Moriarty. Oxford
2008, p. 5.
32 »Hier ist nun das, was Archimedes bedurfte, aber nicht fand: ein fester Punkt,
woran die Vernunft ihren Hebel ansetzen kann, und zwar, ohne ihn weder an die
gegenwärtige, noch eine künftige Welt, sondern bloß an ihre innere Idee der Frei-
heit, die durch das ›unerschütterliche‹ moralische Gesetz als sichere Grundlage
darliegt, anzulegen, um den menschlichen Willen selbst beim Widerstande der
ganzen Natur durch ihre Grundsätze zu bewegen.« Immanuel Kant: »Von einem
neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie« (1796). In: Ders.:
Werkausgabe. Wilhelm Weischedel, ed. Vol. 8. Frankfurt 1977, p. 403. Lasswitz
summarizes the two moments of the »Copernican experience« posited by Kant
in terms of the recognition of individual freedom and the self-awareness necessary
to realize the apparent deception of the empirical standpoint. We can also connect
this moment back to Rotman’s argument about the development of a »meta-sub-
ject«. For Serres, the Copernican Revolution is not a paradigm in itself, but an-
other example of the search for a fixed reference point; see Serres, Le système de
Leibniz (see footnote 8), p. 661.
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Archimedes claimed, that if only he had a point that was firm
and immovable, he would move the whole earth; and great
things are likewise to be hoped, if I can find just one little
thing that is certain and unshakeable.31
While Descartes believes to have found this »immovable« point
in which a philosophy is based in the concept of the ego as res cogi-
tans, Kant speaks 150 years later of that which »Archimedes
needed, but did not find […] a firm point, upon which reason can
place its lever;« this point is, for Kant, the »inner idea of freedom
which rests there as secure basis through the unshakeable moral
law« and instead of the »world« to be moved is »the human will,
even faced with the resistance of all nature through the basic prin-
ciples [of the idea of freedom].«32 The persuasiveness of these two
statements obscures the fact that Descartes and Kant mobilize the
Archimedean point for different purposes. Descartes’ reference to
the »immovable point« leads him to the one certainty of the res
cogitans. Kant’s metaphor of the »firm point« is spatially more
complex and demands that we visualize the point as the place where
reason’s lever is rested and upon which it turns – the fulcrum. Pure
mechanics only requires one point – the fulcrum – to construct a
lever, but for the purposes of a philosophy of the individual, there
33 I would like to thank Edgar Landgraf for pointing out this correlation.
34 »Zur Theorie d[er] Construction der Hebel äußerst wichtig. Jedes Universum
z. B. hat sein Hypomochlion wie seinen Indifferenzpunkt«; KFSA 18, p. 170:
no. 550. See also Brown: The Shape of German Romanticism (see footnote 3),
for a different perspective. With reference to Herder’s »vocabulary of linear or-
ganization and of the balance of opposing forces,« Brown writes that such lan-
guage was »by no means absent in the Romantic period,« it was usually
integrated into »the more characteristically Romantic circle« (p. 33); Brown
emphasizes that the Romantics »advance beyond the mechanistic world view«
(ibid.). My reading suggests that the »mechanistic world view« is not abandoned,
simply reconfigured, and needs further study even – or especially – in the context
of Romantic organicism. 
101need to be at least two: one for the machine, and the other for the
agent who manipulates it. Two firm points, that is, which augment
the reach of the human will and knowledge considerably. I would
like to emphasize in the following pages that one of Romanticism’s
idiosyncrasies in this regard is to stake its own ground in the phi-
losophy of the point by refusing to privilege one point over the
other, a claim that requires taking a closer look at Schlegel and
Hardenberg’s appropriation of the lever.
Just one technical term is required to understand what Harden-
berg and Schlegel have to say about the lever. In addition to refer-
ring to the fulcrum as the Drehpunkt or Stützpunkt, as was
common around 1800 and still in usage today, they also use the
Greek word hypomochlion, whose literal meaning of ›resting be-
neath‹ shares the same etymology with the word subject.33 In
Schlegel’s notes, there is a clear structural affiliation between those
aphorisms which define the point generally as the beginning of a
philosophical system, and those which focus on the particular me-
chanical point of the hypomochlion. »For a theory of construc-
tion,« he writes, »the lever [is] extremely important. Every
universe for example has its hypomochlion and its point of indif-
ference.«34 Schlegel also marshals the particular mechanics of the
lever – which, in its simplest model, positions the fulcrum between
two arms, balancing two forces – to strengthen his comparison. Just
as the hypomochlion is that point where opposing forces cancel
out, Schlegel writes: »Perhaps the center in every universe is dou-
bled, in the literal sense heterogeneous, One from two, two at the
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35 »Vielleicht ist das Centrum in jedem Universum doppelt im eigentl[ichen] Sinne
heterogen, Eins aus zweien, zwei zugleich aus verschiednen Ordnungen«;
KFSA 18, p. 171: no. 550.
36 »Hypomochlion nur Symbol, das wahre ist schwebend; der thätige freie Mensch
ist sein eigenes Hypomochlion«; KFSA 18, p. 171: no. 560.
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same time from different orders.«35 Schlegel does not give us much
to go on, but it helps to remember that the fulcrum doubles as a
mathematical (imaginary) and a physical point. The examples of
heterogeneity Schlegel chooses in this particular aphorism are tem-
perature and (acoustic) »accord,« but the intrinsically doubled
nature of the fulcrum recalls the irreducible »dark places« seen
before in the mixtures of old and new coexisting within a philo-
sophical system. Schlegel also connects the hypomochlion directly
to the individual when he writes: »Hypomochlion [is] only sym-
bol, the true is hovering [schwebend]; the active free human is his
own hypomochlion.«36 In this note, found in close proximity to
the one just cited before from Schlegel’s Philosophical Fragments,
we are left to puzzle whether the doubled, heterogeneous nature of
the hypomochlion which Schlegel has just insisted upon still holds
true. What does it mean for man to be his own hypomochlion, his
own fulcrum? We are far removed from both Descartes’ and Kant’s
meditations on an individual whose powers were augmented
through the use of the lever and closer to a model where individual
is fulcrum and lever at once. If there is a duplicity to be observed in
the positing of man as the fulcrum point, then it seems to be not
in a mixture of contrary elements (for example, the individual’s own
»system« as opposed to the one imposed upon him by his cultural
environment), but in the tension between what is »only symbol«
and that which is »true« and schwebend – the tension between
the fixed point of the fulcrum and the mobile arms of the lever. 
Hardenberg’s aphorisms do not contain any statement as simple
as the one that man is his own hypomochlion. They do, however,
engage more directly with the technology of the lever and the me-
chanical laws governing it. From his notes we know that he learned
the laws of the lever by reading and excerpting from Eschenmayer’s
Principles of Nature-Metaphysics Applied to Chemical and Med-
37 »Wir können uns die Aerme eines Hebels mit ihren Kräften als zwei Bewegungs-
größen vorstellen, und das Hypomochlion als den Punkt ansehen, in welchem
beide Grössen gegeneinander wirken. Da nun die Aerme des Hebels Linien vor-
stellen, deren entfernte Endpunkte nicht bewegt werden können, ohne daß zu
gleicher Zeit auch die am Centro motus gelegene[n] Punkte der Linien bewegt
werden, so sind die Zeiten, in der die Kräfte des Hebels auf das Hypomochlion
wirken, auch bei jeder Ungleichheit der Länge der Aerme dennoch gleich.« Carl
A. Eschenmayer: Säze aus der Natur-Metaphysik auf chemische und medicinische
Gegenstände angewandt. Tübingen 1797, pp. xiv-xv.
38 »Man sollte nicht von Größen, sondern von Stärken und Schwächen der Bewe-
gung reden«; NS 2, p. 381.
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ples to the natural sciences. In this text, Eschenmayer defines the
hypomochlion for what scientists would call a »first-class« lever
in the following way:
We can imagine to ourselves the arms of a lever with their
forces as two magnitudes of motion, and regard the hypo-
mochlion as the point in which both magnitudes work
against each other. Since the arms of the lever represent lines
whose separated endpoints cannot be moved, without at the
same time the points at the center of motion are also moved,
thus the moments [Zeiten], in which the forces of the lever
work upon the hypomochlion, the same even with every in-
equality in the lengths of the arms.37
The forces Eschenmayer describes refer to the lever’s moment of
torque or Drehmoment, as the force of turning. Hardenberg ex-
cerpts this definition from Eschenmayer and expands it with the
comment: »One should not speak of magnitudes [Größen] but
rather of strengths and weaknesses of the motion.«38 He thereby
emphasizes an interplay between the increasing and decreasing
forces. And, on the basis of Eschenmayer’s explanation of the prin-
ciple of the torque moment as product of weight and distance from
fulcrum (whereby the concept of »equilibrium« in the context of
the lever means that the sum of all torque moments is zero), Hard-
enberg elaborates: »more intensity as opposed to greater exten-
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39 »Mehr Intensität gegen größere Extensität. Mithin muß zur Herstellung des
Gleichgewichts – am kürzeren Arm eine stärkere Masse hängen, oder darauf
drücken – um so zu kompensiren«; NS 2, p. 381.
40 »Der Hebel ist schlechthin ohne starre Linien und Unterstützungspunct aus der
Lehre der Kraft überhaupt – den Centralkräften überhaupt zu erklären«; NS 3,
p. 470: no. 1105. See also: »Neue Deduktion des Hebels, aus dem Hebepuncte
etc. durch Centrifugalkraft«; NS 3, pp. 442-443: no. 907; »Der Hebel muß, wie
mich dünkt, nach Gesetzen der himmlischen Mechanik erklärt werden – nach
Gesetzen der Anziehung. Die Anziehung ist nicht directe [sic], sondern in Be-
ziehung auf einen dritten Punct – centralisch. (Über die Centralpuncte)«; NS
3, p. 77.
41 »Centralkräfte« around 1800 usually refer to centripetal and centrifugal forces.
See for a description of these terms as well as a cautionary note Johann Samuel
Traugott Gehler: »Centralkräfte«. In: Ders.: Physikalisches Wörterbuch oder
Versuch einer Erklärung der vornehmsten Begriffe und Kunstwörter der Natur-
lehre. Leipzig 1787, p. 487-502.
42 In some ways, Hardenberg is ahead of his time in this regard, since the equivalent
of a lever without fulcrum will not be scientifically verified until the advent of
general relativity theory.
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sity.«39 A tendency just starting to form here becomes more evident
in his later notes when he writes »The lever is absolutely without
rigid lines and point of support to be explained from the theory of
force in general – the central forces in general.«40 Whereas Schlegel
embraced the hypomochlion as the metaphorical center-point of
both the universe and the individual, Hardenberg, in the context
of his studies of mechanics, suggests that we can do away with it al-
together. According to this aphorism, we can define what the lever
does just as adequately with the concept of forces alone41 as we can
when we rely upon a model diagrammed through lines and points.
Despite the apparent simplicity of Hardenberg’s call for a lever
without rigid lines and point of support – and one can at least sense
intuitively the basic change he describes – it is by no means obvious
what implications he would like to draw from it or even what kind
of scientific reasoning would support such a claim. If you want to
have a lever around 1800, you must have a point.42 We can perhaps
resolve the contradiction with the thought that the equilibrium of
a lever does not depend on the actual point from which one calcu-
lates its forces. In this sense, the choice of point is arbitrary, the ful-
43 That means that one can make the same calculation from every point on the lever
and arrive at the result that the total force of the weights on the lever are equiva-
lent to the force of the fulcrum.
44 »Die Stimmung d[es] B[ewußt]S[eyns] – des Darstellens aller Art ist die Stim-
mung des Krystallisirens, der Bildung – und Vermannichfachung – also gehaltne
Ruhe – statische Kraft – rationalisirende (equilibrirende) Kraft – proportionelle
Evolutionskraft – eine beständige Größe im veränderlichen Wechsel (Ruhepunkt
am Hebel)«; NS 3, p. 432: no. 836.
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modern physics describes the lever and its forces, which lead to the
devaluation of any single point, have at least two consequences.
First, when required to confront »forces« rather than »rigid
lines,« instead of the visual metaphor of a »lever of reason« (Kant)
we are left with an abstraction that can less easily be visualized. And
secondly: Hardenberg, more so than Schlegel, mobilizes the con-
cept of force as a way of downplaying nostalgia for any particular
position of the hypomochlion (or subject). He recognizes that the
lever can be manipulated as a means for increasing individual force
– in the Archimedean sense – but he also imagines situations where
the individual assumes the position of the fulcrum:
The temper [Stimmung] of the consciousness – of represen-
tation of every kind is the temper of crystallization, of the
formation – and manifold-making – thus held rest – static
force – rationalizing (equilibrizing) force – proportional
force of evolution – a constant quantity in the shifting alter-
nation (point of rest on the lever)44.
As in the mechanical-theoretical descriptions, here too the fulcrum
point has become almost unnecessary, parenthetical, and the lever
is simply the metaphorical figure of a Stimmung (which could also
be thought of as a »mood« or a »disposition«). The images of
rest, of forces in harmony, or of controlled and balanced mobility,
stand in stark contrast to those contexts in which the point explodes
into geometrical figures of infinite scale, and also to the mighty
lever of reason. The notion that the hypomochlion acts as a model
of transition between mathematical and mechanical abstractions
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45 »Kielmeyers Idee vom Übergang einer Kraft in die Andre – (von ihrer Successi-
ven und Simultanen Existenz.) (Synth[esis] d[er] Antike und Moderne)«; NS 3,
p. 432: no. 838. Hardenberg refers here to Kielmeyer’s theory of a compensation
that maintains a balance of forces in the living organism. The synthesis of old and
new recalls the »dark places« of the philosophical systems as described by
Schlegel.
46 »Inpunctationsmanier der Bezeichnung der Veränderungen des Stätigen. z. B.
Übergang des Kindes zum Manne. Bezeichnung des Übergangs, (d[er] Seele,)
mit Puncten«; NS 3, p. 432: no. 833.
47 The lever therefore belongs to the »indirect tools« of Hardenberg’s oeuvre and
what has alternately been called his »indirect technique (Liedtke) and »indirect
construction« (Gaier). See Ralf Liedtke: Das romantische Paradigma der Che-
mie. Paderborn 2003; Ulrich Gaier: Krumme Regel. Tübingen 1970.
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on the one hand and the organism on the other, as this aphorism
suggests, is also illuminating with regard to other aphorisms from
the same manuscript where Hardenberg tests out the lever’s exem-
plary balance in transitional moments. A neighboring aphorism, for
example, refers to Kielmeyer’s concept of a balance of compensating
forces in the living organism: »Kielmeyer’s idea about the transition
of one force into the other – (of its successive and simultaneous exis-
tence.) (Synthesis of the antique and modern).«45 A second aphorism
from the same manuscript page envisions the transition from child
to man through designated points which could chart the change
within a greater continuum.46 As fleeting as these examples are, they
show how Hardenberg thematizes the ability of the lever to act in-
directly, as part of a larger process.47 He distills from the mechanics
of the lever a particular rhetorical figure, the figure of transition and
the preservation of opposites, which already has an established cur-
rency in his scientific and philosophical work: it is the well-known fig-
ure of galvanic chains and the Voltaic pile.
3. Final points
The purpose of this paper has been to highlight the idiosyncrasies
in Schlegel’s and Hardenberg’s writing on the point while at the
same time examining ways in which they connect to a tradition of
107philosophical inquiry which has itself struggled with one of the
»simplest« yet also most elusive of all concepts. The connection
between the Romantics and the philosophical tradition, as de-
scribed in the previous pages, is elusive: Schlegel’s and Hardenberg’s
own narrative of philosophical points seems to harbor its own
»dark places« with reference to seventeenth- and eighteenth-cen-
tury debates on the point. This does not amount to a reinvention
of the concept, however. Rather, Schlegel and Hardenberg’s think-
ing takes up several common problems in the historical debates on
the point and reworks them in ingenious ways. Questions pertain-
ing to the distinction between mathematical and physical points,
the relation of the point to motion, and the usefulness of the point
in the conception and demarcation of a subject position, each res-
onate in Romantic musings on the point. In particular, this paper
explored two scenarios which concretized the otherwise scattered
»philosophy of the point« to which Hardenberg alludes: the first
was the figure of the trajectory generated by an »inciting« point;
the second was the figure of the mechanical lever. Each of these sce-
narios raises – if indirectly – the question of individual power, and
each of them can be seen as a response to a potential paradox about
the point’s dual status of being inside and outside at once. For
Schlegel, this leads to the positing of locations of hybridity within
the system, described in terms of doubled historicity and ahisto-
ricity. For Hardenberg, the mechanical lever becomes a locus where
the individual is effectively replaced by a balance of forces, an idea
that takes the old Archimedean topos in a new light while at the
same time recalling the ambivalence of the mathematical and the
physical point.
As a concluding thought that could also be a point of departure
for further research, one could also pursue the relationship be-
tween the mathematical and the physical point even further in the
context of Romantic political thinking. Hardenberg’s thought that
we are »personified, all-powerful points« who seek the »design«
(Entwurf) eventually unfolds from the individual to the political
unit of the family when one reads the aphorism to the end:
»[o]nly insofar as man conducts a happy marriage with himself –
and makes up a beautiful family, is he at all capable of marriage
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48 »Zur Welt suchen wir den Entwurf – dieser Entwurf sind wir selbst – was sind
wir? personificirte allmächtige Puncte. Die Ausführung, als Bild des Entwurfs, muß
ihm [dem Entwurf] aber auch in der Freythätigkeit und Selbstbeziehung gleich seyn
– und umgekehrt. Das Leben oder das Wesen des Geistes besteht also in Zeugung
Gebährung und Erziehung seines Gleichen. Nur insofern der Mensch also mit sich
selbst eine glückliche Ehe führt – und eine schöne Familie ausmacht, ist er überhaupt
Ehe und Familienfähig. Act der Selbstumarmung«; NS 2, p. 541: no. 74.
49 »Die Ehe ist für die Politik, was der Hebel für die Maschinenlehre. Der Staat be-
steht nicht aus einzelnen Menschen, sondern aus Paaren und Gesellschaften. Die
Stände der Ehe sind die Stände des Staats – Frau und Mann. Die Frau ist der
sog[enannte] ungebildete Theil«; NS 3, p. 470: no. 1106.
50 One could elaborate these comments in connection with Hardenberg’s view on
monarchy. In Faith and Love, for example, he writes that monarchy is »a true
system, because it is bound to an absolute middle point; to a being, which belongs to
humanity, but not to the state.« (»Die Monarchie ist deswegen ein ächtes System,
weil sie an einen absoluten Mittelpunct geknüpft ist; an ein Wesen, was zur Mensch-
heit, aber nicht zum Staat gehört«; NS 2, p. 489. What kind of point is the »absolute
middle point« of the monarchy? It is a being who belongs to humanity but not to
the state«. »The king is no citizen of the state, and no state official« (ibid.).
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and family«48 When he writes about marriage, he says that it is to
politics »what the lever is for the theory of mechanics« and that
»[t]he state is comprised not of individual people, but rather of
pairs and societies.«49 For Hardenberg, then, the basic unit of the
functioning state is not the personified point, but a lever whose two
arms connect the disparate conditions of woman and man. It is
striking that the lever in this description conforms to Hardenberg’s
idea of a balance of forces with no rigid lines and points in that it
has no fulcrum, no hypomochlion; it is tempting to say: no partic-
ular »subject.« In this model, the relation of the individual to the
machine-state is not simply one of part and whole, which would be
the case of the point-individual who is part of either the greater me-
chanical clockwork or an organism. Instead, the disposition of the
pair stands in for the state as a whole, but the pairing of »formed«
man and »unformed« woman suggests that the levers of this par-
ticular mechanism move in a dynamic compensation and transfer
of forces.50 This example, which emphasizes the mobility of the
point (and the lever), also serves as a reminder as to why, though
overlooked, it fits so well in a Romantic pantheon of concepts cul-
tivated to move easily across discursive divides.
